ACKNOWL EDGMENTS
Th is book is the fruit of many journeys. I began to think about writing it at the end of 2010, in the middle of a very vivacious and productive conversation at the conference "States of Feminism/Matters of State: Gender and the Politics of Exclusion, " which I had co-organized as a fellow at the Jan van Eyck Acad emy (jve) in Maastricht. Th e exchange with the other organizers, Avigail Moss, Rebecka Th or, and Kirsten Stakemeier, as well as with some of the participants at the conference-Rada Ivekovic, Chiara Bonfi glioli, Vincenza Perilli, and Neferti Tadiar-encouraged me to develop my ideas in a more coherent form. Th at conference and the challenging intellectual climate itself could have not been pos si ble without the passionate eff orts of the advising researchers of the jve Th eory Department-Katja Diefenbach, Dominiek Hoens, and Mladen Dolar-to keep a space for critique alive in the midst of the neoliberal Netherlands. I thank also my colleagues and friends for two memorable years (2009) (2010) in that institutional context. Beyond those I mentioned above, I am grateful to Emiliano Battista, Pietro Bianchi, Giuseppe Bianco, Nathaniel Boyd, Vanessa Brito, Luisa Lorenza Corna, Gal Kirn, Dubravka Sekulic, Tzuchien Th o, Oxana Timofeeva, and Samo Tomsic. From the beginning of 2011 until 2013, I was fortunate to be able to work intensely on this book thanks to two generous fellowships, at the Center for Excellence at the University of Konstanz (Germany) in 2011 and at the Institute for Advanced Study (ias) in Prince ton in 2012 and 2013. I would like to thank Rita Casale, my colleague and friend in Konstanz, with whom I discussed several parts of this book when they were still in an unshaped and underdeveloped form. Her astute and always challenging comments pushed me to clarify my concepts. I am thankful for her continuous support and friendship.
I owe a special debt to Joan W. Scott, with whom I had the pleasure plea sure to discuss all parts of this manuscript during my period of research at the ias in Prince ton. She encouraged me to pursue this proj ect from the outset and provided always invaluable comments and impor tant criticisms throughout the vari ous stages of its writing. Her rigor and commitment to critical thinking have been a great inspiration. My colleague and friend at the ias in Prince ton, Catherine Rottenberg, read most of this book several times with incredible patience and passion, challenging me to avoid inconsistencies and shortcuts. Her critical insights undoubtedly helped to make this book better than it might other wise have been. I am very grateful to Neve Gordon for reading parts of this book at vari ous phases of its development and for not only giving me helpful comments, but also encouraging me to clarify the (oft en unnecessary) intricacies of my arguments. Nicola Perugini, David Eng, and Moon-Kie Jung also read diff er ent sections of this book and off ered very useful criticisms. I could not wish for better readers and friends. For their precious support with bibliographical resources and other orga nizational matters during my pe
Introduction
In the Name of Women's Rights I think we are dealing with very sick women [i.e., full-veiled Muslim women] and I do not think we have to be determined according to their pathology.
-Élizabeth badinter, a French feminist phi los o pher Islam . . . expels Jews and gays and fl ushes de cades of women's rights down the toilet.
-geert wilders, the leader of the Dutch far-right Party for Freedom Th ere cannot be a regularization for those [mi grants] who entered illegally, for those who rape a woman or rob a villa, but certainly we will take into account for regularization all those situations that have a strong social impact, as in the case of
[female] mi grant caregivers.
-roberto maroni, the ex-leader of the Italian far-right party Northern League Th e success of the far right in the 2014 elections for the Eu ro pean Parliament attracted a great deal of international attention. Across the continent, nationalist right-wing parties either won an unpre ce dented number of seats or consolidated their signifi cant popu lar support.
1 Th ese electoral achievements, coupled with the harshness of the anti-Islam slogans that characterized the parties' campaigns, triggered fears of a return of fascism. Yet one of the striking features that distinguishes con temporary Eu ro pean nationalist parties from their older counter parts is the invocation of gender equality (and occasionally lgbt rights) within an other wise xenophobic rhe toric. Indeed, despite their lack of concern with elaborating concrete policies of gender equality and their masculinist po liti cal style, these parties have increasingly advanced their anti-Islam agendas in the name of women's rights. From Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, to Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy-the key animators of the "brown international" upon which this book focuses-one of the central tropes mobilized by these right-wing nationalists is the profound danger that Muslim males constitute for western Eu ro pean socie ties, due, above all, to their oppressive treatment of women. 2 Some scholars have described the nationalists' turn to themes of women's equality as an attempt to modernize their agenda and increase their female constituencies.
3 Others have drawn a link between Eu rope and the United States, where conservative politicians framed post-9/11 imperialist wars in the Middle East as missions to liberate Muslim women from Muslim men. 4 And yet right-wing nationalists are not the only forces waving the banner of women's equality in ways that seem to contradict their core ideologies and policies. On the other side of the po liti cal spectrum some well-known and out spoken feminists have also joined the anti-Islam choir. Th roughout the 2000s, the internationally renowned French feminist phi los o pher Élizabeth Badinter, the Dutch feminist politician Ayan Hirsi Ali, and the famous Italian "occasional feminist" Oriana Fallaci denounced Muslim communities as exceptionally sexist, contrasting them to western countries as sites of "superior" gender relations.
5 Similarly, women's organ izations as well as top-ranking bureaucrats in state gender equality agencies-oft en termed femocrats-all singled out Islamic religious practices as especially patriarchal, arguing that they had no place in the western public sphere. 6 Accordingly, they all endorsed legal proposals such as veil bans while portraying Muslim women as passive victims who needed to be rescued and emancipated. Th is heterogeneous anti-Islam feminist front, thus, presented sexism and patriarchy as the almost exclusive domains of the Muslim Other.
Th e peculiar encounter between anti-Islam agendas and the emancipatory rhe toric of women's rights is not, however, restricted to nationalists and feminists. Neoliberal advocates who are other wise antinationalist have also increasingly deployed anti-Islam repre sen ta tions in the name of women's rights. 7 A good example of this are the civic integration programs for "third-country nationals, " programs that are, as I will explain, a landmark of neoliberalism. Designed to foster the inclusion of mi grants into the fabric of Eu ro pean socie ties, these programs have made mi grants' long-term residency dependent upon a certifi ed commitment to learn the language, culture, and values of the destination country. Th ey urge mi grants both to acknowledge women's rights as a central value of the West and to assimilate to western cultural practices, which are presented as more civilizationally advanced. What is striking here as well is that civic integration policies tend to generalize claims regarding the inherent misogyny of Muslim communities and apply them to all non-western mi grants.
Th us, three very diff er ent po liti cal actors-right-wing nationalists, certain feminists and women's equality agencies, and neoliberals-invoke women's rights to stigmatize Muslim men in order to advance their own politi cal objectives. But why are these diff er ent movements invoking the same trope and identifying Muslim men as one of the most dangerous threats to western socie ties? Are nationalist parties "betraying" their traditionally antifeminist politics, feminists their emancipatory politics, and neoliberals their antinationalist politics as they all deploy women's rights against Muslim male subjects? Who exactly are the nationalist, feminist, and neoliberal forces mobilizing gender equality against Islam, and what are their specifi c arguments? Are we witnessing the rise of a new, unholy alliance, or is this seeming consensus across the po liti cal spectrum merely coincidental and contingent? And, fi nally, why are Muslim women being presented with offers of "rescue" in a context of rising Islamophobia and anti-immigration sentiments, particularly regarding employment and welfare?
As I discuss in the following sections, vari ous scholars have explained the new centrality of gender and sometimes gay equality within anti-Islam agendas as a consequence of the shift to the right and the war on terror that marked the 2000s in Eu rope and the United States-particularly aft er 9/11. Th ey thus emphasize the securitarian logic of the con temporary rescue narratives targeting Muslim women as victims and read these narratives mainly as po liti cal constellations that characterize the current neoliberal and nationalist Zeitgeist.
Th is book argues instead that impor tant political-economic dimensions under lying these paradoxical intersections in western Eu rope have, for the most part, been overlooked. Furthermore, I claim that the ways in which anti-Islam campaigns in the name of gender equality feed on and shape broader anti-immigration and racist ideologies and institutions have not received the sustained attention they deserve. In the Name of Women's Rights thus intends to propose new links, conceptualizations, and categories of analy sis in order to decipher the reasons for the surprising intersection among nationalists, feminists, and neoliberals. In order to name this intersection and frame the political-economic logic underpinning it, I introduce the notion of femonationalism.
Short for "feminist and femocratic nationalism, " femonationalism refers both to the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and neoliberals in anti-Islam (but, as I will show, also anti-immigration) campaigns and to the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatization of Muslim men under the banner of gender equality. Femonationalism thus describes, on the one hand, the attempts of western Eu ro pean right-wing parties and neoliberals to advance xenophobic and racist politics through the touting of gender equality while, on the other hand, it captures the involvement of vari ous well-known and quite vis i ble feminists and femocrats in the current framing of Islam as a quintessentially misogynistic religion and culture. In order to defi ne and map out femonationalism, this book focuses on three specifi c national contexts (the Netherlands, France, and Italy during 2000-2013) and three specifi c po liti cal actors and agendas:
(1) nationalist right-wing parties (the Partij voor de Vrijheid [pvv; Party for Freedom] in the Netherlands, the Front National [fn; National Front] in France, and the Lega Nord [ln; Northern League] in Italy); (2) a number of prominent feminist intellectuals and politicians, women's organ izations, and femocrats within these countries; (3) and neoliberal policies targeting non-western mi grants within civic integration programs.
Two qualifi cations are needed at this point. First, I should stress that, unlike the right-wing nationalist parties that instrumentalize gender equality within broader anti-immigration campaigns, the feminists, women's organ izations, and femocrats whom I foreground have directed their main criticism at Muslims and not at mi grants more generally. However, this book details the involvement of some of these feminists, women's organizations, and femocrats in the elaboration and implementation of some components of civic integration programs that target non-western mi grant women in general.
8 I thus show how anti-Islam rhe toric has permeated institutional mechanisms that target the non-western mi grant population at large. In the Name of Women's Rights attempts to unravel this complex interweaving, claiming that while anti-Muslim rhe toric has become the dominant anti-Other rhe toric, it dovetails at certain moments and in certain locations and discourses with anti-immigration rhe toric. I explain this complexity by, on the one hand, pointing to how the slippage between anti-Islam and anti-immigration politics occurs through the assumption of the Muslim man and woman as the main representatives of the binary oppressor and victim. Th is binary is then projected and generalized to nonwestern mi grants from the Global South more generally (as, for instance, in the case of the civic integration policies). On the other hand, I discuss how the binary of oppressor and victim used today to foreground Muslims in par tic u lar feeds on repre sen ta tions and ste reo types that were deployed during colonial times in all three countries and that are part and parcel of more general racist repertoires.
Second, my critique of the western Eu ro pean portrayal of Muslim women as the quin tes sen tial victims of non-western patriarchy does not in any way imply a denial of the in equality or repression to which these women, like women from any other cultural/social/national background, may potentially (and oft en factually) be subject within their socie ties. Yet this book is concerned above all with their repre sen ta tions and conceptualizations in the western Eu ro pean cultural imagery and with the ways in which such repre sen ta tions and conceptualizations are informed by (and in turn inform) deeply rooted racist ste reo types as well as economic interests and practices, which aff ect other non-western (mi grant) women as well.
Ultimately, In the Name of Women's Rights aims to introduce a more robust theoretical framework for analyzing the deployment of gender equality within xenophobic campaigns. It does so in a way that moves beyond the "politicist" lenses that have largely dominated the analy sis of these phenomena. Th e weaving together of right-wing nationalism, certain strains of feminism, and neoliberalism in the name of women's rights needs, I maintain, to be deciphered by disclosing its very concrete political-economic modes of operation. Th e introduction of the notion of femonationalism therefore aims to provide a theoretical concept to capture the politicaleconomic agenda informing the invocation of women's rights by a range of diff er ent actors. Th is invocation, I argue, is intimately informed by a profound fear of the Other and, given our current historical conjuncture, by Islamophobia. Accordingly, I suggest that femonationalism must be understood as an ideology that springs from a specifi c mode of encounter, or what I prefer to call a convergence, among diff er ent po liti cal proj ects, and that is produced by, and productive of, a specifi cally economic logic. Th e next sections are thus devoted to clarifying three key theoretical dimensions of femonationalism: femonationalism as convergence, as ideological formation, and as neoliberal po liti cal economy.
Femonationalism as Convergence
In the Name of Women's Rights proposes to analyze the intersection among nationalist right-wing parties, certain prominent feminists/femocrats, and vari ous neoliberal policies that seem to merge at the crossroad of anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns in the Netherlands, France, and Italy, as a case of convergence. Th e term describes the encounter between diff er ent actors and movements in a given space without them losing their relative autonomy, and without the encounter itself (necessarily) producing identity or homogeneity. Th ere is a large body of critical lit er a ture documenting the paradoxical endorsement of women's and lgbt rights by right-wing and traditionally antifeminist/homophobic parties and neoliberals, as well as the support, in recent years, by some feminists and queers of Islamophobic agendas. Scholars have used two main approaches to explain the type of encounter between nationalism, feminist/queer movements, and neoliberalism. Th e fi rst approach refers to this encounter as "instrumentalization" and "exploitation. " Such an approach has been put forward, for instance, by the sociologist Éric Fassin and the critical race scholar Liz Fekete in the context of their respective discussions of "sexual nationalism" and "enlightened fundamentalism. " Th ey introduce these notions to defi ne the deployment of women's and lgbt rights in anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns in vari ous western Eu ro pean contexts.
9 Th e second perspective, which focuses on notions of "collusion" or "alliance," has been proposed most prominently by the queer scholar Jasbir Puar in her study of "homonationalism. "
10 Th is concept foregrounds the ways in which gay rights have been mobilized against Muslims and racialized Others within new homonormative frameworks.
By proposing to understand femonationalism as the outcome of a convergence, my aim is not to reject these analyses. Instead, I hope to provide a conceptual framework that can better explicate the distinct and heterogeneous confi gurations upon which this book focuses. Indeed, I argue that the notion of convergence enables us to ask two impor tant questions about Dutch, French, and Italian nationalist right-wing parties, neoliberals, and the composite feminist/femocratic camp I explore. First, what are the ideological matrices that have encouraged these parties, actors, and movements to advance anti-Islam/anti-immigration politics, in spite of the signifi cant diff erences among them? Second, what interest might right-wing nationalists, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats have in endorsing a type of politics that is (or appears to be) at odds with at least certain aspects of their po liti cal agendas?
I explore the fi rst question by providing a critical genealogy of rightwing parties' participation in anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns in the name of women's rights. Th is book accordingly charts the shift s that have occurred within the nationalist right-wing camp: from "ethnic nationalism" to "cultural nationalism" and "western supremacy"-particularly in Italy and France-or from "western supremacy" to "ethnic nationalism" in the case of the Netherlands.
11 In the Name of Women's Rights thus critically addresses the tendency within the scholarly lit er a ture to defi ne far-right parties like the pvv, the fn, and the ln as "populists. " While this term is employed to capture the demagogic nature of their embrace of themes that did not previously fi gure in their agendas, I argue that the concept of populism-at least on its own-fails to address the core ideological matrix that leads these right-wing parties to foreground gender equality within xenophobic campaigns. As a modality of po liti cal mobilization centered upon the binary "Us" versus "Th em, " pop u lism can account for right-wing forces targeting Muslim and non-western Others as enemies of western socie ties. However, it cannot explain the paradox according to which these parties do not frame Muslim and non-western mi grant women as enemies in the same way, or even how they off er to rescue these women. I thus contend that if we want to decipher this seeming paradox, we need to draw on theories of nationalism, particularly in the ways they are articulated within postcolonial feminism and critical race studies.
Th is book also interrogates the arguments put forward by several prominent and infl uential feminist intellectuals and politicians (including of Muslim background), women's organ izations, as well as femocrats from left to right in their anti-Islam campaigns. I show that despite the many po liti cal, theoretical, and biographical diff erences among these feminist actors, the common denominator of their anti-Islam stance is a fundamental agreement that gender relations in the West are more advanced and must be taught to Muslim women who are other wise taken to be agentless objects at the mercy of their patriarchal cultures. It is this fundamental agreement, I argue, that brings feminists and femocrats of diff er ent po litical stripes to position gender equality and Islamic practices as opposed.
Th is western supremacist-infl ected lens has also informed the civic integration policies that are nationalist as well as neoliberal through and through. By analyzing these policies, I show how they have become a key site where the convergence between the anti-Islam positions of feminists and nationalists with neoliberalism occurs. Th ese policies, as I explain below, are informed by the neoliberal logic of workfare and individual responsibility and have blended together with the right-wing ideology of homogeneity and superiority of the (western) nation as well as with the "westocentric" feminist notion of emancipation through work.
Th e notion of convergence also helps us answer the second question raised above: namely, what interests do right-wing nationalists, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats have in endorsing a type of politics that is (or appears to be) at odds with at least part of their own po liti cal agendas? In asking this question, I draw on Derrick Bell's "interest-convergence theory. "
12 Th is theory posits that the dominant racial group will support the subaltern racial group's fi ght for equal rights only if the former believes it has something to gain in the pro cess. Transposing Bell's argument to the understanding of the convergence among nationalists, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats on issues of gender in equality and Islam in the three countries upon which I focus, In the Name of Women's Rights explores the strategic calculations, gains and losses, and benefi ts and costs for nationalists and feminists, in par tic u lar when endorsing a politics they had not previously supported.
On the one hand, I maintain that by encouraging a rhe toric of division, or a Manichean splitting of the po liti cal and ideological debate into one counterposing "Us" (white, Eu ro pean, western, Christian, civilized, "womenfriendly") to "Th em" (nonwhite, non-European, non-western, Muslim, uncivilized, misogynist Others), right-wing nationalist parties have every thing to gain. In a historical conjuncture in which the theme of gender equality, like that of human rights, has become the common currency in the name of which new racist and imperialist confi gurations of power become hegemonic, a vague, mainstream idea of gender equality can quite easily be used opportunistically by these parties to contribute to the consolidation of the nationalist proj ect. Indeed, these parties' invocation of the lack of gender equality within immigrant and particularly Muslim communities has been instrumental to generate and reinforce racist sentiments among western Eu ro pe ans. 13 On the other hand, I argue that by converging with anti-Islam and racist voices in the name of women's rights, feminists and femocrats eff ectively lose. Th at is, by suggesting that gender in equality is an issue aff ecting mostly non-western women, the anti-Islam feminists and femocrats have contributed to diverting attention away from the many forms of in equality that still aff ect western Eu ro pean women. Neoliberal governments have seized on the opportunity opened up by the identifi cation of women's rights as a "migrant/Muslim woman-only issue" to decrease funds for more universal programs aimed at tackling gender injustice more generally.
14 Instead of helping it to gain more visibility, the widespread resort to the theme of women's rights as a "civilizational" battle demotes it from the rubric of general societal prob lems and dislocates it as a "non-western women prob lem" only-or as a prob lem that aff ects western Eu ro pean women as potential victims of Muslim and non-western/nonwhite men.
It is here that my notion of convergence departs from that of Bell. While his interest-convergence theory helps us to analyze the tactical intentions (and manipulations) behind nonemancipatory po liti cal movements' sudden endorsement of emancipatory proj ects, Bell's theory cannot account for the reasons emancipatory movements or oppressed subjects might converge with conservative parties. It also cannot explain why emancipatory movements fail to question the sudden endorsement by conservatives of previously denied or contested rights. In other words, the interest-convergence theory, as framed by Bell, cannot explain the "self-defeating" invocation by some feminists and women's equality agencies of anti-Islam arguments in the name of women's rights. Even though some of the feminists and femocrats endorsing these arguments might think that their stance brings gender equality back more prominently onto the public agenda, in this book I explicate how and why the opposite is actually the case.
Th e convergence producing femonationalism thus can be seen as the result of (and as producing) a fundamental tension and contradiction: that between the nonemancipatory forces of Islamophobia and racism on one side, and the emancipatory strug gle against sexism and patriarchy, on the other. Th is book maintains that it is precisely this tension that makes femonationalism si mul ta neously so strong and widespread, but also (at least potentially) so fragile. Th e strength of femonationalism lies above all in the fact that the foregrounding of Muslim (and, to a lesser extent, nonwestern mi grant) men and women as respectively "oppressors" and "victims" is accomplished thanks to the participation of a range of prominent feminists and femocrats as well as some female politicians/public fi gures of Muslim background. In the Name of Women's Rights thus details how their participation in the anti-Islam discourse reinforces the stigmatizing operations of the nationalists and mainstream media because it allows them to invoke these feminists and femocrats as "privileged insiders" who have fi rsthand experience of gender in equality. Si mul ta neously, this book suggests that this tension also makes femonationalism a fragile convergence that may be weakened when its contradictory components are critically confronted.
My notion of convergence thus acknowledges and emphasizes the constitutive frictions and diff erences, gains and losses, that inhabit the femonationalist camp. It stresses that the relationships among diff er ent social and po liti cal actors and agendas constituting the ideological space of femonationalism are multiple, ambiguous, and potentially beyond the actors' own intentions. As I intend to show, a deeper understanding of these contradictions can help us to advance a radical critique of the negative effects of this convergence on gender justice in general.
Femonationalism as Ideological Formation
Diff er ent names have been given to the po liti cal constellations emerging out of the intersection among nationalist, neoliberal, and feminist or lgbt politics in a range of countries. Yet whether in terms of a Zeitgeist, a discursive tactic, or a po liti cal proj ect, scholars have mostly pointed to the politicalconjunctural dimensions of this phenomenon. 15 More specifi cally, they have foregrounded the con temporary temporal juncture in which these encounters take place, yet they have paid insuffi cient attention to their histories. For this reason, I argue that the convergence among nationalist right-wing parties, neoliberal policies, and feminists/femocrats in the three countries I examine is better captured in terms of an ideological formation. Th ere are three impor tant theoretical reasons for qualifying femonationalism as an ideological formation.
First, the notion of ideological formation allows us to examine the philosophy underpinning femonationalism-a philosophy that I previously identifi ed as a common conviction regarding the supremacy of the West over the Rest. But it also enables us to identify what is new and what is déjà vu within this formation, or what I would term its "modularity. " By invoking the concept of modularity to account for femonationalism's seeming ubiquity, I bring into play one dimension of Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism. As I discuss at length in chapter 3, this concept refers to the double character of the nation-form (i.e., both universal and par tic ular) and to its capacity to be transplanted across space and time. As Manu Goswami argues in her discussion of Anderson's concept of modularity, "nationalist claims of particularity and the imagined singularity of national formations only become intelligible against and within a global grid of formally similar nations and nation-states. " 16 Accordingly, the notion of the modularity of femonationalism foregrounds how the current positioning of Muslim men and women-with the latter playing the role of the passive victims of non-western male vio lence who require protection-can be regarded as a con temporary face of a well-known western topos, namely, that of the "white men [claiming to be] saving brown women from brown men, " to use Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's apposite formulation. 17 Today, Muslim women personify the homogenizing fi gure of the non-western woman as the victim par excellence of non-western male vio lence in the western Eu ro pean imagery. I thus show that while current media and politi cal discourses focus on male Muslims as oppressors, in western Eu rope the male immigrant threat in the 1990s came from the East. Th e bad immigrant was then mostly embodied by eastern Eu ro pean men, usually portrayed as involved in criminal activities and sex traffi cking, while women from these countries were oft en depicted as victims of a backward culture and/or of the sex industry.
Moreover, as postcolonial critics have compellingly shown, in colonial times in the Netherlands, France, and Italy (among others), the insistence upon unequal gender relations and the idea that colonized women were victims of patriarchal vio lence-which were understood as markers of indigenous populations' "culture"-was instrumental in strengthening the technologies of domination over colonial subjects. 18 Th is book thus charts the historical recurrences and ideological premises underpinning the con temporary mobilization of gender equality as a tool to depict male Others as sexual threats and female Others as sexual victims and as the property of western "saviors." It is this rearticulation of all these ideas, fragments, and traces from the recent past in the changed context of neoliberalism and rising Islamophobia that defi nes the modularity of femonationalism.
Second, femonationalism operates "through discursive regularities" that, as Stuart Hall put it, are at the core of ideological formations. For Hall, ideological formations are those that " 'formulate' their own objects of knowledge and their own subjects; they have their own repertoire of concepts, are driven by their own logics, operate their own enunciative modality, constitute their own way of acknowledging what is true and excluding what is false within their own regime of truth. Th ey establish through their regularities a 'space of formation' in which certain statements can be enunciated. "
19 Th e notion of ideological formation thus allows us to conceptualize more precisely the discursive plane that constitutes and consolidates femonationalism. Th e con temporary mobilization of feminism to promote anti-immigration and Islamophobia within an increasingly nationalist framework would not be thinkable without the deployment of a massive discursive media apparatus. One has only to think of the enormous media display to which the West has been subjected, particularly since 9/11: the bombing of Af ghan i stan presented as necessary to liberate Muslim women from the burqa; draconian immigration laws in the Netherlands passed to purportedly avoid the "import" of brides from Morocco or Turkey; or, more recently, the portrayal of Syrian male refugees as responsible en masse for the sexual aggressions against and robberies of women during the New Year's Eve festivities in Germany. Th is apparatus, then, has produced the unquestionable and conclusive association between gender vio lence and Islam. Femonationalism, in other words, has been constituted and nourished through the production and practice of meanings that have come to saturate the western cultural imaginary: namely, through the condensation of such meanings, symbols, images, and discursive regularities into the senso comune (literally, "common sense"), to use Gramsci's apt concept. 20 Fi nally, I conceptualize femonationalism as an ideological formation because I claim that the mobilization of gender equality by nationalist parties, neoliberals, and feminists/femocrats in ways that intensify xenophobia also stems from very concrete economic interests. In his seminal text, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Louis Althusser invited us to think of the materiality of ideologies in terms of the ways in which they serve the reproduction of the material conditions of production. Th at is, for Althusser, ideological state apparatuses (i.e., the family, the media, the school, religion, etc.) play the role of guarantors in the reproduction of the conditions that re-create exploited labor power on a daily basis, both materially and psychologically. Althusser saw these apparatuses as functioning in a way that ensured the maintenance of the conditions for the subjection of the subaltern classes to (and their internationalization of ) the "dominant ideology. " 21 In its Althusserian articulation, the notion of ideological formation thus urges us to explore femonationalism's concrete materiality. Th e notion of ideological formation, then, suggests that we must examine the forms in which the convergence between a number of heterogeneous po liti cal subjects on the notion that sexism is the exclusive domain of the non-western Other conceal the need to maintain and reproduce specifi c political-economic arrangements. Ultimately, as I will explain in the next section, the notion of femonationalism as an ideological formation allows us to demonstrate how the xenophobic mobilization of gender equality reinforces the material chain of production and social reproduction.
Femonationalism as Neoliberal Po liti cal Economy
Th e few studies that have attempted to take into account the politicaleconomic dimensions of the turn to gender and gay quality by conservative, neoliberal, or racist politics have referred mainly to neoliberalism as a type of background force. For example, Sirma Bilge maintains that the possibility for gender and sexuality to become the "operation fi eld of racist and imperialist nationalisms" is mainly due to their "fi ttingness" with the neoliberal mode of hiding structural inequalities behind cultural confl icts. 22 Similarly, Paul Mepschen and Jan Duyvendack have stressed how neoliberalism has facilitated the encounter between lgbt and nationalist politics not only by promoting the rise of a gay consumerist culture but also by reaffi rming the authority of the nation-state over the production of identities, while allowing for the (de)regulation of the economy. 23 Th ey thus maintain that sexual nationalisms are consistent with neoliberal strategies of market segmentation and the promotion of chauvinist politics.
Th ese previous studies, however, treat neoliberalism as the economic theater of operation for the encounter between a diff er ent array of forces, but not as one of the main characters onstage. While agreeing that neoliberalism is central for understanding these phenomena, this book argues that neoliberalism is not simply the contextual ground on which the femonationalist convergence takes place, but it is itself constitutive of such a convergence. Th e mobilization of women's rights within xenophobic campaigns, which has become prominent under neoliberalism, does not merely divert attention away from growing economic inequalities by means of "culturalist" modes of displacement. Nor has such mobilization operated solely through making equal rights campaigns functional to consumerist cultures. Rather, I understand neoliberalism to be a political-economic formation that "institutionalizes" the femonationalist ideology as part of the functioning of the state apparatuses in order to (re)or ga nize the productive and particularly the socially reproductive sphere.
In the Name of Women's Rights details the neoliberal institutionalization of femonationalism by analyzing the economic components of the civic integration programs for third-country nationals. As I mentioned above, these programs require mi grants to learn what are claimed to be the main cultural tenets of the receiving Eu ro pean states in order to be granted residency. Here gender equality is presented as a pillar of the western Eu ropean nation, and the declaration of re spect for women's rights has been turned into a condition for settlement. By reconstructing the history of the implementation of these programs, and the po liti cal profi le of their designers and supporters as well as their gendered dimensions, I show how they have incorporated the repre sen ta tion of Muslim women and men-as, respectively, victims and oppressors-into the disciplinary apparatus of the state's policies on immigration. I thus demonstrate how these policies are a specifi c and very concrete site in which we see a slippage between antiIslam ste reo types and pro cesses of Othering that involve and aff ect not only Muslim women but also non-western mi grant women more generally. Furthermore, I detail how civic integration policies do not operate merely at the "disciplinary" level of the state, framing Muslim and non-western mi grant males as misogynist subjectivities in need of re-education. Instead I demonstrate how these policies also crucially operate at the economic level.
Premised upon the idea that Muslim and non-western mi grant women are backward individuals who are mostly confi ned to the home, from 2007 onward civic integration policies in the Netherlands, France, and Italy have encouraged these women to integrate eco nom ically by seeking employment outside the house hold. 24 As I discuss in chapter 4, economic integration for non-western mi grant women in par tic u lar (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) has eff ectively functioned through the application of neoliberal workfare devices. Women's organ izations and gender equality state agencies have supported and been actively involved in implementing these initiatives, which address the diffi culties of the female mi grant population in the labor market of the country of destination. An in-depth analy sis of these initiatives, however, underscores that nonwestern mi grant women participating in civic integration programs have been systematically directed toward a handful of job types: hotel cleaning, house keeping, child minding, and caregiving for the el derly and/or the disabled. In spite of the great emphasis placed on the need for these women to emancipate themselves by entering the productive public sphere by the vari ous feminists, women's organ izations, and the femocrats that I discuss in this book, in real ity non-western mi grant women have been confi ned to care and domestic work in the private sphere. Th ere is thus a contradiction when feminists and femocrats urge emancipation for Muslim and non-western mi grant women while channeling them toward the very sphere (domestic, low-paying, and precarious jobs) from which the feminist movement had historically tried to liberate women. Th is is not merely a rhetorical contradiction but is concretely performed in action. In order to understand the under pinnings of this "performative contradiction, " I reconstruct a critical genealogy of the notion of economic in depen dence as it emerged in diff er ent waves of the feminist movement, and the related concepts of productive work as opposed to social reproduction. Th is critical genealogy suggests that it is precisely the tension between these two realms (i.e., production and social reproduction) and the devaluation of social reproduction by many western Eu ro pean feminists that have unwittingly contributed to the reconfi guration of social reproduction as a sector dominated by a very marginalized and vulnerable section of the workforce, namely, Muslim and non-western mi grant women.
In the Name of Women's Rights also documents the active role of rightwing governments and of some nationalist right-wing parties in the early 2010s in directing these women into the care and domestic, or social reproductive, sector. I highlight the role of the 2007-2011 global fi nancial crisis as the crucial backdrop against which the nationalist and neoliberal rhe toric of non-western mi grant men and women (Muslim and nonMuslim) as oppressors and victims needs to be understood. By documenting how pro cesses of "commodifi cation of care" during the crisis have impacted the expansion of the labor market of female mi grant caregivers, this book examines the complex ways in which Muslim and non-western mi grant women have become the main providers of social reproduction in a context of growing demand for care. In addition, through a detailed analy sis of data on non-western mi grants' economic per for mance in terms of employment trends and sectors between 2007 and 2013, I demonstrate that Muslim and non-western mi grant women were not only spared during the crisis, but their employment and activity rates actually grew during these years. Unlike non-western mi grant men, who most oft en fi nd work in economic sectors in which relocation and closure of productive sites can easily be used as "crisis-management" devices to reduce the number of laborers, non-western mi grant women are in fact mostly employed in the care and domestic economy. Th is is the sector to which capital's classic crisis-management operations do not apply: social reproduction, quite simply, cannot be relocated or shut down during times of economic crises. Care work must continue even during periods of recession to guarantee the daily functioning of our socie ties. Indeed, in the pres ent context of western Eu ro pean women's growing rates of employment, it is increasingly Muslim and non-western mi grant women who are providing care for children, the disabled, and the el derly. Th is is occurring precisely at a historical moment in which western Eu rope both is privatizing welfare ser vices and is confronted with an ever-larger aging population.
I argue that the emphasis on non-western mi grant women overall as individuals to be helped in their integration and emancipation pro cess, including through job off ers, is pos si ble because they, unlike male mi grant workers, currently occupy a strategic role in the social reproductive sector of childcare, el derly care, and cleaning. Rather than "job stealers, " "cultural and social threats, " and "welfare system parasites"-all designations regularly used for Muslim and non-western mi grant men-Muslim and nonwestern mi grant women seem to be those who allow western Eu ro pean men and particularly women to work in the public sphere by providing that care that neoliberal restructuring has commodifi ed.
In the Name of Women's Rights thus suggests that the double standard applied to Muslim and non-western mi grant women in the public imagi-nary as individuals in need of special attention, and even "rescue, " operates as an ideological tool that is strictly connected to their key role in the reproduction of the material conditions of social reproduction. Femonationalism should be understood as part and parcel of the specifi cally neoliberal reor ga ni za tion of welfare, labor, and state immigration policies that have occurred in the context of the global fi nancial crisis and, more generally, the western Eu ro pean crisis of social reproduction. Th e very possibility that nationalists and neoliberals can exploit emancipatory ideals of gender equality, as well as the convergence of feminists/femocrats with anti-emancipatory, xenophobic politics, springs in large part from the specifi cally neoliberal reconfi guration of the western Eu ro pean economy in the past thirty years.
A Note on Methodology
Th is book focuses on the Netherlands, France, and Italy as signifi cant cases for the study of femonationalism. Since the early 2000s these three national contexts have gained international prominence as leading Euro pean laboratories for the convergence among the nationalist right, neoliberal policies, and anti-Islam feminists and femocrats. Despite the obvious distinctions between the Dutch, French, and Italian contextsin terms of immigration histories, cultures of integration, nationalities, and types of migration, as well as diff erences in the respective traditions of nationalist and feminist movements, and application of neoliberal agendas-they have nonetheless exhibited a striking resemblance and synchrony in the development of femonationalism. My objective is not to provide a discrete assessment of each country, or even a comparative typology. Rather, this book attempts to highlight the parallels among these national contexts and po liti cal actors and to disclose the transnational character of femonationalism within the local. Albeit specifi c to these national settings, the theorization I off er provides a conceptual framework that may be useful for analyzing similar phenomena in diff er ent national settings across western Eu rope in par tic u lar and in the West more generally.
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With this aim, I analyze the three most prominent right-wing nationalist parties in each of the three countries (i.e., the pvv in the Netherlands, the fn in France, and the ln in Italy). While they do not represent the whole nationalist constellation in each context, they have played a crucial role in each country's po liti cal life since the mid-2000s. More impor tant, these three parties have largely determined the right-wing nationalist turn that has characterized Dutch, French, and Italian politics in the second de cade of the millennium. Th eir emphasis on Muslims and non-western mi grants' alleged negation of the nation's au then tic roots, culture, history, and values, as well as their mobilization of women's rights against nonwestern Others, have been widely covered by the mainstream media and invoked in public debate.
Second, I analyze the claims made by feminists who have come to public prominence from the early 2000s onward due to their resolute embrace of anti-Islam arguments. My exploration focuses on the most infl uential and vocal group of actors in each country: prominent feminist intellectuals; feminist politicians from left to right, including some of North African or Muslim background; women's organ izations; and key fi gures in state gender equality agencies, or femocrats.
Fi nally, this book analyzes the deployment of gender equality themes in anti-Islam and anti-immigration campaigns by examining the neoliberal philosophy underpinning the new civic integration programs promoted by the Eu ro pean Commission from the early 2000s onward. I detail the ways in which the neoliberal agenda of workfare prioritizes "skilled migration" and frames mi grants' integration as a matter of both individual responsibility and economic contribution, while showing how these agendas intersect with the stigmatization of non-western (unskilled) mi grant males in the name of women's rights.
My analy sis of the rise of femonationalism employs diverse methods, including interviews with key respondents, participant observation, analy sis of statistical data, and critical discourse analy sis (cda). In par tic u lar I have examined party programs, po liti cal speeches and interviews, visual materials (videos, posters, documentaries), offi cial eu and national documents, immigration and integration laws and policies, as well as data on labor and migration from the Labor Force Survey, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Labor Organ ization. Th e analyses and arguments I pres ent are also informed by many years of scholarly work on gendered migration, multiculturalism, and the gendered division of mi grant labor in all three contexts. It provides a detailed account of the ways in which three right-wing nationalist parties have increasingly resorted to a rhe toric of gender equality in order to advance their anti-Islam/anti-immigration po liti cal agendas. Th is chapter also traces the participation of several prominent feminist intellectuals and politicians, women's organ izations, and femocrats in the campaign against Islamic patriarchy and Muslim women's "special exposure" to misogyny and gender vio lence. Th e claim in this chapter is that the constitution of a common space in which seemingly oppositional forces such as feminism and right-wing nationalism can voice concerns about gender vio lence as the exclusive domain of the Muslim Other stems from a shared belief in the supremacy of western values.
Chapter 2, "Femonationalism Is No Pop u lism, " begins with a discussion of how, in the past de cade, sociologists and po liti cal scientists have understood right-wing parties' exploitation of gender equality as a form of popu lism. Challenging this approach, it argues that the concept of pop u lism fails to make sense of the centrality these parties assign to gender equality. Instead, I contend that if we want to grasp the reasons for the sudden and instrumental mobilization of feminist issues by these right-wing parties, we need to draw on the theories of nationalism developed in the context of postcolonial feminism and critical race studies. To do this, I explore the emergence of femonationalism within the historical context of decolonization of non-western countries and recolonization of non-western subjects in Eu rope and the West. I thus link these discussions to notions of "racialization of sexism" and "sexualization of racism. "
Chapter 3, "Integration Policies and the Institutionalization of Femonationalism, " discusses the recent legislation on civic integration, implemented in the Netherlands, France, and Italy between 2006 and 2013 by neoliberal governments with the support of nationalist parties. Focusing on civic integration programs, I show how gender equality and women's rights are among the most impor tant values that mi grants are expected to internalize and re spect. While infl uential interpretations of civic integration policies have claimed that the theme of gender equality conveyed by these policies demonstrates the liberal, as opposed to nationalist (and racist), character of these programs, I demonstrate that the opposite is actually the case. I show that civic integration policies are arguably the most concrete and insidious form of the institutionalization of femonationalism as an ideological formation.
Chapter 4, "Femonationalism, Neoliberalism, and Social Reproduction, " focuses on one largely overlooked point of convergence between anti-Islam feminist, nationalist, and neoliberal politics: namely, the policies pertaining to non-western mi grant women's "economic" integration. I begin by showing that the demand that these women participate in work is largely framed within a context of workfare. Second, I demonstrate that the implementation of these policies, including by some prominent feminist politicians, women's organ izations, and state gender equality agencies, has functioned through actively directing non-western mi grant women (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) toward the care and domestic sectors (social reproduction), which has traditionally been conceived as "feminine. " Th e contradiction emerges when we recall that it is precisely against this gendered division of labor-men in the public sphere, women in the privatethat the feminist movement has historically strug gled. To understand the conditions of possibility for, and the trajectory of such a contradiction, I propose that we reconstruct the complex feminist genealogy of economic in de pen dence, and the related concepts of productive work, which has historically been placed in opposition to social reproduction. Th is critical reconstruction enables us to better grasp how some feminists and femocrats have converged with the ideology of femonationalism.
Chapter 5, "Th e Po liti cal Economy of Femonationalism, " emphasizes that the double standard applied today to non-western mi grant populationsaccording to which men are the "dangerous Other" while women are the "victims to be rescued"-follows a political-economic logic. I argue that we need to rethink and challenge the prevalent assumption that immigrants and women constitute a "reserve army of labor. " Analyzing the strategic role of non-western mi grant women (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) in the social reproductive sector of care and domestic work, in the context of the state's retreat from public care provisions, aging populations, and growing participation of western Eu ro pean women in the labor market, I show that the cheap labor of mi grant women has become essential for the reproduction of western Eu ro pean socie ties and economies. Even during the recent economic crisis, the rate of employment of mi grant women in the care and domestic sector grew, unlike (male) mi grant employment in other sectors. Th is testifi es to a fundamental diff erence between male and female mi grant labor in con temporary western Eu ro pean socie ties: unlike their male counter parts, immigrant women now belong to what can be called a "regular army of labor. " Th is category enables us to lay bare the economic rationale behind the repre sen ta tion of Muslim and non-western mi grant women as "redeemable subjects. "
Ultimately the analyses provided in these pages underscore how the mobilization of women's rights within xenophobic campaigns has not been limited to po liti cal rhe toric. A detailed analy sis of the political-economic foundations of these developments is essential not only to strengthen our critique but especially to help us fi nd alternative po liti cal practices to confront their devastating consequences. Le Pen"; Akkerman and Hagelund, " ' Women and Children First!' "; Towns et al., "Equality Conundrum. " 4 Th e invasion of Af ghan i stan that followed the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York was presented to, and endorsed by, the international public as a mission to liberate Afghan women from their oppression under Taliban rule just as much as an act of defense and retaliation against the perpetrators of the attacks. From then onward, images of veiled Muslim women as imprisoned bodies have entered our western collective unconscious alongside those of Muslim bearded men seemingly plotting terrorist onslaughts against western targets. All across the West, not only right-wing nationalist and conservative forces but also some left ist and feminist organizations and public fi gures have endorsed the portrayal of Muslim women as victims to be saved. In the United States, the Feminist Majority Foundation, one of the leading feminist voices in the country, eff ectively supported the invasion of Af ghan i stan as necessary to liberate Afghan women from "gender apartheid" (Russo, "Feminist Majority Foundation's Campaign to Stop promoting globalization. It is thus assumed to transcend national boundaries and to reject nationalist ideologies. Chapter 3 challenges this widespread view. For an overview of these debates, particularly within the fi eld of international po liti cal economy, see Harmes, "Th e Rise of Neoliberal Nationalism. " 8 Some of the arguments most recently deployed by some feminists and femocrats to stigmatize Muslim males and to portray Muslim women as victims to be saved replicate ste reo typical repre sen ta tions of the alleged victimhood of non-western women that characterized western Eu ro pean accounts of migrant women at least from the 1970s onward. Moreover, the civic integration policies that some feminists, women's organ izations, and femocrats supported, or directly implemented on the basis of their anti-Islam perspective, apply not only to mi grants from the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, but also to Africans in general, Albanians, Rus sians, Serbians, Chinese, and so forth (in short, to non-eu/non-western mi grants). For this reason, throughout this book I refer to Muslim and non-western mi grant men and women, unless the context requires reference to specifi c nationalities and/or religious affi liations. In par tic u lar, I will highlight how the majority of Muslim women (mi grants and nonmigrants alike) and of women migrating to western Eu rope from the Global South and from some of the countries of the postsocialist bloc are aff ected by at least some of the policies and pro cesses I outline in this book. 9 Éric Fassin examines the ways in which in both France and the United States themes of sex and sexuality, gender equality, and gay rights have been displaced from the private to the public/po liti cal sphere. Th e foregrounding of sexual freedoms as matters of open, public discussion, and thus, "democratization, " however, has been accomplished through the identifi cation of mi grants, and particularly Muslims, as aliens to those same pro cesses. Sexual democracy, or the sexualization of democracy, has thus been instrumentalized in the ser vice of sexual nationalism, whereby mi grants' and Muslims' integration and loyalty to their hosting western nations are tested by means of their commitment to the sexual values of these nations (É. Fassin, "Sexual Democracy and the New Racialization of Eu rope"). Drawing on the notion of "cultural fundamentalism" to describe the dogmatic and exclusionary ways western culture has been rebranded by the right wing as a tool for Othering mi grants, in a famous 2006 article Liz Fekete coined the term "enlightened fundamentalism. " Th is term describes the power ful deployment of women's rights and gay rights by right-wing parties in con temporary xenophobic campaigns across Eu rope and their resort to the Enlightenment tradition as the foundation of western Eu ro pean culture, aimed against Muslims and mi grants more generally. According to Fekete, what has made enlightened fundamentalism so strong in the aft ermath of 9/11 is the way in which many "self-proclaimed feminists" jumped on the right-wing "band wagon" (Fekete, "Enlightened Fundamentalism?, " 12). Accordingly, Fekete accuses these feminists of "paternalism" and points to their contradictions when they support repressive policies like Muslim veil bans in the name of women's freedom of choice. For Fekete, both the right wing and feminists are "exploiting" the theme of gender equality within cultural fundamentalist campaigns. Similarly to Fassin, the Dutch sociologists Paul Mepschen and Jan Willem Duyvendak also use the notion of "sexual nationalism" to discuss contemporary public repre sen ta tions of Muslims as a threat to sexual freedoms in the Netherlands. Specifi cally, they explicate the sexualization of nationalism in terms of the "culturalization" and "sexualization" of citizenship, that is, the ways in which Dutch citizenship is understood more and more in terms of cultural and moral identifi cations. Accordingly, they show how Muslims and other non-western mi grants are criticized for their supposed lack of loyalty to certain Eu ro pean cultural constellations and sexual liberties, which are now recast as the foundation of western history. Mepschen and Duyvendak also see the foregrounding of sexual freedoms in anti-Muslim agendas as an instance of "instrumentalization, " particularly in the case of the "populist right. " What facilitates this instrumentalization, they further maintain, is the neoliberal context, understood as a "proj ect to reinforce or restore the authority of state institutions over the production of (national) citizenship and po liti cal subjectivity and the regulation of labor markets and urban marginality" (Mepschen, Duyvendack, and Tonkens, "Sexual Politics, Orientalism and Multicultural Citizenship in the Netherlands"). See also Mepschen and Duyvendack, "Eu ro pean Sexual Nationalisms. " 10 Centering her attention on the intersection between gay politics and US nationalists aft er 9/11, Jasbir Puar emphasizes the exclusionary state as the master signifi er of the con temporary focus on male Others as misogynistic and xenophobic enemies of western civilization. More specifi cally, Puar discusses the encounter between US nationalism and queer sexual politics in terms of "collusions, " which she sees as productive of a "homonationalist" formation. Puar's "homonationalism" thus both describes the mobilization of gay rights against Muslims and racialized Others within the American nationalist framework, but also refers to the integration of "homonormativity"-that is, domesticated homosexual politics-within the US agenda of the war on terror. As Puar puts it, homonationalism is a "discursive tactic that disaggregates US national gays and queers from racial and sexual others, foregrounding a collusion between homo sexuality and American nationalism that is generated both by national rhe torics of patriotic inclusion and by gay and queer subjects themselves" (Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 39). Puar has drawn attention to the manifold ways in which the US state of exceptionalism and exception has co-opted impor tant sections of the gay movement. Rather than a mere instrumentalization, or tactical exploitation of the theme of gay rights by nationalism, Puar thus highlights the active involvement-and responsibilities-of the queer movements themselves that have supported (wittingly or unwittingly) this new racist confi guration. Puar's work has been greatly infl uential in setting the terms of the debate among scholars. Discussing the deployment of gender and lgbt equality in the Québécois and Dutch public debate on Muslim patriarchy, Sirma Bilge and Sarah Bracke, respectively, adopt Puar's concept of homonationalism as the new hegemonic form of sexual nationalism. While the former stresses the collusive role of Québécois "state feminism" in par tic u lar in the establishment of the governmental rhe toric positing Muslims as a peril to women and gay rights, the latter explores both the "alliance" between Dutch feminism and right-wing xenophobic politics seeking to "rescue" Muslim women from their alleged oppression, as well as the application of such rescue narratives to queer movements. Bilge also gestures toward a materialist understanding of the collusion between feminism, lgbt, and anti-Islam rhe toric by foregrounding neoliberalism as the backdrop of Québécois con temporary sexual nationalism, which enables the marketization of feminist and lgbt movements. See Bilge, "Mapping Québécois Sexual Nationalism in Times of 'Crisis of Reasonable Accommodations' "; and Bracke, "Subjects of Debate. " insights of Michel Pêcheux, I speak of ideological "formation" rather than ideology as such, in order to emphasize that femonationalism is historically determinate and requires broader theoretical tools and historical contextualizations to be properly decoded. See Pêcheux, "Mechanism of Ideological (Mis)recognition. " In contrast to a certain tendency in Althusser to think of ideologies as internally uniform, however, I stress the internal inconsistencies, fragmentation, and contradictions of femonationalism as a specifi c ideological formation of the twenty-fi rst century. Althusser tended to conceive of ideologies as almost direct functions of state deliberations and ultimately productive only of subaltern subjects-insofar as ideological interpellation, for Althusser, is what produces individuals as subjects, in a way that seems not to leave room for the emergence of critical, antagonistic subjectivities. For a critique of this ele ment in Althusserian ideology theory, see Rehmann, Th eories of Ideology. 22 Bilge, "Mapping Québécois Sexual Nationalism, " 306. Bilge understands neoliberalism as the logic that merges equal rights agendas and business rationalities by means of marketizing equality social movements such as feminism and lgbt and turning these movements' supporters into consumers and neoliberal subjectivities. Th e end of "neo-liberal equity politics, " accordingly, is the reduction of "social justice to a question of rights and [the concealment of] harsh operations of global capitalism and under lying systems of structural injustice" (306). 23 Mepschen and Duyvendack, "Eu ro pean Sexual Nationalisms. " 24 Th e Eu ro pean Integration Fund was established in 2007. Chapter 4 discusses at length how this fund has been used by vari ous organ izations, including women's equality agencies within and outside state bureaucracy, to promote the economic integration of non-western mi grant women. I thus show the contradictions opened up for feminists in par tic u lar by the concrete implementation of these economic integration policies. 25 By "western Eu rope" I am referring to the area comprising the fi ft een member-states of the Eu ro pean Union prior to the accession of ten candidate countries-mostly from eastern Europe-in 2004, alongside the non-eu countries Switzerland and Norway. Th e restriction of my analy sis to western Eu rope, rather than to Eu rope, or to the Eu ro pean Union as a whole, is due to two main reasons. First, despite the recent incorporation of most eastern Eu ro pean countries into the Eu ro pean Union, western and eastern Eu rope still constitute, and are perceived by the population at large, as two distinct po liti cal, social, and economic blocs. In terms of migration fl ows, for instance (a key area of interest of this study), whereas most western Eu ro pean countries are mostly areas of immigration-including of eastern Europeans-eastern Eu ro pean countries are areas of emigration to the western regions. Furthermore, at the level of ideological construction, whereas western Eu ro pean countries are depicted (and depict themselves
